

Ordinatio 3, distinction 35, the single question, “Are wisdom, science, understanding, and counsel intellectual habits?”

1 Concerning the thirty-fifth distinction the question is whether wisdom, science, understanding, and counsel are intellectual habits.

2 Look up the arguments pro and con.¹

3 The answer is clear from what was said above [d. 34 n. 72]. Wisdom of course is an appetitive habit, namely charity, although it includes something prior, namely faith, as an act of will includes a prior act of intellect [d. 34 n. 32]. Science and understanding, by contrast, are other ways of talking about a perfect and an imperfect habit of faith, as I said earlier [d. 34 n. 72]; and counsel, understood as a habit, is the habit of prudence [d. 34 n. 70].

4 You might object: “Understanding and science are not a single habit, because in acquired cognition the habit of a principle, which is understanding, is distinct from the habit of a conclusion, which is science. Therefore, by parity of reasoning, in infused cognition the habit of cognizing the articles is distinct from the habit of cognizing what follows from the articles.” I reply: The inference is not valid. In acquired cognition one assents to a true proposition because it is evident in virtue of its terms. But what is properly a principle has a different evidentness—a different *kind* of evidentness—in virtue of its terms than a conclusion has in virtue of its terms. The latter evidentness is caused by the former and that is why there can be different habits with respect to each—habits that regard the formal character of the truth in the respective kinds of propositions. Granted—but in matters of belief one does not assent because of the evidentness of what is believed, but rather because of the truthfulness of the one who reveals what is assented to. That truthfulness is one and the same for both the primary articles and the other matters of belief that are derived from them. And for that reason there are not distinct habits for

¹NYQ omit this sentence. For the arguments, see *Lectura* III d. 35 q. un. nn. 2–5.

the former and the latter, because there is one and the same object under one and the same formal character.²

²The translation in this paragraph follows Q. The edition gives a rather clumsier and more verbose text; there is no different in substance.