

Ordinatio 3, distinction 32, the single question: “Does God love all things equally through charity?”

B. This love is not proper to one of the divine persons

12 From this a second point follows: no unqualified perfection is proper to one of the divine persons.

13 For there is another way to prove this: if love were proper to one of the divine persons, it would be proper to the Holy Spirit, and thus either the Holy Spirit would not proceed necessarily or God would necessarily love something other than himself. A parallel argument concerning the Word: the Word does not imply any proper relation to anything other than God. For there is a single argument that applies to both the Word and the Holy Spirit: a relation cannot be necessary for one extreme, because a relation requires both extremes. Now nothing other than God, whatever sort of being it has, is necessary of itself; therefore, no relation to anything other than God, whatever sort of being it has, can be unqualifiedly necessary in itself. Therefore, no such relation can be intrinsic to any one of the divine persons insofar as that person possesses the divine nature according to some determinate mode of possession.

14 Concerning the Word in particular, one can argue that if the Word implied a proper relation to a creature as declarative, this would be in virtue of the creature’s having being in the Father’s memory and the Father’s uttering his Word accordingly. But this is false in several ways¹:

First, no creature has being properly in the divine memory *qua* memory, as I discussed in Book II, question 1 [n. 32]; for a creature comes to be in intelligible actuality first through an act of the divine intelligence.

¹Reading with Q. The edition has *aut hoc esset* (“this would be either”) with no correlative *aut* (“or”) and *et ex isto membro videtur sequi falsum multipliciter* (“from this alternative something false clearly follows in many ways”—an impossible reading, since the first argument Scotus proceeds to give does not identify a false entailment of the view but states the falsity of the view itself).

Second, if this were true, a creature would be a basis for moving the infinite intellect to its Word insofar as it is the Word of the creature. Thus something finite would move the infinite intellect, which would cheapen that intellect. At any rate, if (*per impossibile*) one rock had being in the divine memory (in the way that sometimes there is one intelligible item in our own memory), that rock in the memory would then be the basis for uttering a Word of itself, and then the claim under consideration—namely, that something finite would be the basis for moving the infinite intellect—would follow.

And again, since it is not formally infinite in the memory or even in the intelligence, there does not seem to be any plausible way for it to found opposite relations of origin.

It also seems to follow that there would be as many Words as there would be intelligibles in the Father's memory, and these Words would be unqualifiedly distinct, for if they were in the memory and were uttered accordingly, they would be uttered in just the way that each is intelligible.

15 Now one could understand the previous claim in a different way, as meaning that the Word declares other things in some sort of intelligible being insofar as those other things have the character of a terminus of an act of declaration. But that is not proper to the Word, because the whole Trinity produces them in intelligible being, as I said in Book II, question 1; for each person remembers everything for himself.²

16 I explained in Book I, distinction 32 [nn. 24–25], the sense in which the Father in particular is said to utter the Word. 'Utter,' in this context, implies a twofold relation: one real relation of origin, which is the relation of what is expressed to the one expressing, and another relation of reason, which is the relation of what is declared to the one declaring. Thus, the Word is so called because he is both what is expressed by the one uttering and what declares what is uttered by him. Now this relation of declaring is merely appropriated to the Word, because he proceeds according to the mode of begotten, and thus declarative, knowledge. However, if we

²*Ordinatio* II d. 1 n. 32–33.

understand 'declare' formally, this relation is common to the three persons; but if we understand it principiatively, it can be proper to the Father, since the Father declares principiatively, in so far as he expresses begotten knowledge.

17 And this twofold way of understanding 'declare' —formally and principiatively— can be seen in other relatives, such as 'make similar' (*assimilare*) and 'make adequate' (*adaequare*). For the form by which something is similar makes it similar formally, whereas the agent that gives that form makes it similar effectively.

18 In the same way it can be conceded that the Father loves through the Holy Spirit, as I explained in Book I, distinction 32 [nn. 32–33]. This is not proper to the Holy Spirit but appropriated to him. And it connotes a twofold relation: one real relation, namely spiration, and the relation of reason in the one spirated to what is loved through him. This relation of reason is appropriated to the Holy Spirit, though in truth it is common to the three persons.