

*Ordinatio* II, distinction 7, the sole question: “Does an evil angel necessarily will badly?”

1 Concerning distinction 7 I ask whether a bad angel necessarily wills badly.

2 Arguments for the negative:

James 2:19: “The demons believe and tremble.” But evidently these are good acts. Therefore, etc.

3 Moreover, the image remains in them, as Psalm 38:7 says: “The human being passes through in an image,” etc. Hence they have a capacity for God and participate in God: for according to Augustine in *De Trinitate* XIV.8.11 the image of God in the soul is “that by which it has a capacity for God and can participate in God.” Now they cannot realize their capacity for God or participate in God otherwise than through a good act. Therefore, there can be a good act in them.

4 Moreover, Dionysius says in *De divinis nominibus* 4, “Whatever is natural to the demons remains intact in them.” Therefore, their free choice remains intact. Now “a power for sinning is neither freedom nor a part of freedom,” according to Anselm in *De libertate arbitrii* 1. Therefore, the demons have freedom of choice with respect to that which freedom of choice concerns per se, which is willing well. Therefore, they can will well.

5 Moreover, no intellect is so turned away from a first principle that it cannot think something true, since first principles are true in virtue of their terms for every intellect. Therefore, no will is so turned away from the ultimate end that it cannot will the ultimate end. The inference is evident through the Philosopher’s comparison in *Physics* II [200a15–16] and *Ethics* VII [1151a16–17]: “As a principle is in speculative matters, so is an end in moral matters.”

There is also another way to prove the inference. “Everyone who is bad is ignorant,” according to *Ethics* III [1110b28–30]; therefore, there is no badness in the will

without error in the intellect. Therefore, in any case in which the intellect cannot be blinded with respect to a given intelligible object, the will cannot deviate from rectitude with respect to that same object as desirable or lovable.

6 Moreover, if they necessarily will badly, and they are always actually willing (since there is no impediment to their willing), it follows that they are always willing badly; but, given that by the law of divine justice an increase in fault corresponds to an increase in punishment, this means that their punishment would increase infinitely; therefore, they will never reach a terminus. And another untenable conclusion follows: if in the demons badness can increase [infinitely], then by parity of reasoning, charity could be increased [infinitely] in the good; and thus it follows that the good would never reach a terminus in happiness, just as the bad would never reach a terminus in badness. Therefore, etc.

7 Moreover, “nothing violent is perpetual” (*De caelo et mundo* I [269b6–10]), because what is violent is contrary to the inclination of the thing in which it is present. And so if that thing is left to itself, it will return to the opposite: for example, if water is left to itself, it will return to coldness. Now badness is contrary to nature, according to Damascene<sup>1</sup>; therefore, it is not perpetual. Therefore, it is not necessarily present in the will.

8 Argument for the affirmative:

In Psalm [73:23] we read, “The pride of those who hated you goes up for ever.” But this cannot be understood in terms of intensity, since anything evil that increased in intensity would be a greater evil. Therefore, it should be understood in terms of extent, and thus they are always sinning.

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<sup>1</sup> *De fide orthodoxa* II.4, 12, 30; IV.20.

## I. Reply to the question

### A. The views of others

9 Two causes of the continuation of evil in the demons have been identified.

The first<sup>2</sup> is as follows. An appetite is proportionate to its apprehensive power, by which it is moved as what is movable is moved by what moves it. Now angels apprehend immovably, non-discursively, because they apprehend by intellect. Human beings apprehend movably, by reasoning discursively: in virtue of reason, they can proceed discursively to either of a pair of opposites. So an angel's will clings immovably [to what it wills] after its first complete apprehension, whereas<sup>3</sup> a human being's will, with respect to a volition that follows reason, clings movably. And so although an angel's will, before it fixed itself by an immovable volition, was capable of being moved to opposites (for otherwise it would not have been indifferently able to sin or to merit), after its first choice it clung immovably to what it chose. And thus the good angels became impeccable, and the bad angels impenitent, fixedly, because of the immobility of their cognitive power.

10 Another approach<sup>4</sup> is as follows. The more perfect a will is, the more perfectly it throws itself into what is willable. A will separate from a body, which is the sort of will the angels have, is altogether perfectly free; by contrast, our will, which is conjoined with a corruptible body, has diminished freedom. And so although our will does have freedom, a will that is altogether separate from a body has freedom in the highest degree. Our will, too, when separated from the body or<sup>5</sup> existing in an incorruptible body, throws itself into its object in such a way that it cannot draw back from it.

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<sup>2</sup> Thomas Aquinas, *De veritate* q. 24 a. 10 in corp.

<sup>3</sup> Reading *autem* (Q) for the edition's *etiam*.

<sup>4</sup> Henry of Ghent, *Quodl.* VIII q. 11 in corp.

<sup>5</sup> "separated from the body or" (*separata vel*): YQ.

11 This view draws on Proverbs 18:5: “When a sinner reaches the depths, he scorns [his sin].” So when a will is perfectly free, prior to a perfect choice, it runs efficaciously to what it wills and establishes its end there. But when it encounters synderesis as an obstacle, it does not press on; instead, by scorning [its sin] it thrusts itself into synderesis and becomes stuck there, so that it does not and cannot will to withdraw itself—in the way that a sword, if thrust into bone, becomes stuck and cannot be withdrawn by the same strength by which it was thrust in, or even by greater strength.

#### B. Refutation of both views at once

12 The authority of Augustine<sup>6</sup> in *De fide ad Petrum* is evidently contrary to the conclusion that these two views have in common. He says there, “If it were possible that human nature, once it has turned away from God and thereby lost the will’s goodness, could have that goodness back by its own power, all the more would this be possible for an angelic nature; for the angelic nature would be more fully endowed with this ability in proportion as it is less encumbered by the weight of an earthly body,” etc. Accordingly, someone could argue as follows: if a human will by its own power could return to justice, all the more so could an angelic will. Therefore, it is not impossible—either because of the immovability of its cognitive power (in which respect an angelic will is unlike ours) or because of its full freedom (in virtue of being separated from body)—for an angelic will to return to justice after it has sinned. Quite the contrary, in fact: according to him, it is more possible for an angelic will than for ours.

13 Moreover, I argue against their shared conclusion.

First, as follows: it is not only the will of a damned angel that is fixed on evil; so also is the will of a damned human being. One ought to assign a common cause for both, as Augustine evidently says a little further on in *De fide ad Petrum*, where he

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<sup>6</sup> Actually Fulgentius, *De fide ad Petrum* c. 34.

claims that there is one common cause on account of which God will judge damned human spirits and angels at the same time; he evidently makes the same claim in *De civitate Dei* [XXI.11, 23]. But neither of those causes will serve to explain why a damned human being is fixed on evil. Therefore, neither will serve to explain why a damned angel is fixed on evil.

14 Proof of the minor premise: a soul conjoined to a body does not have a cognitive power that apprehends immovably in the way that an angel does, as the first view argues; nor does it have such full freedom that it throws itself into its object immovably, as the second view argues. Therefore, one must identify a cause of the soul's fixity on evil when it is separated from the body. So either it becomes fixed on evil before any elicited act (and consequently neither of the aforesaid causes is the cause of its fixity, because it is already fixed on evil before it wills something according to an act of an intellect that apprehends immovably or in virtue of the full freedom that it has in separation from the body) or it became fixed on evil through an act that it elicited when already separated from the body (an act that follows upon an immovable apprehension on the part of an intellect separated from the body, according to the first view, or from full freedom, according to the second view). But the latter possibility seems untenable, because a separated soul does not demerit; rather, it receives whatever merit or demerit it receives through the acts that it had in this life. So prior to its being fixed on evil, it has no act by which it becomes fixed on evil.

15 The case of Lazarus [John 11:1–44] could confirm this. Once Lazarus had died, his intellect had the apprehension of a separated soul, and his will had full freedom (because it was separated from the body). And yet he did not will immovably for either of these reasons: for in that case he would have been impeccable, if good (and so God would have acted against his interest in raising him, since he would have made someone impeccable into someone capable of sinning), or fixed on evil, if bad. Both of those are false, since he is still a wayfarer—unless one imagines that God miraculously

kept him from any activity of the sort that characterizes a separated soul because he had foreordained that he was to be raised; but that does not seem probable, since it is said<sup>7</sup> that he told of many things that had seen [while in that state].

16 Moreover, second: a total cause does not cause differently unless it is in a different condition qua cause, unless there is some difference on the part of the patient or of certain external impediments. Now the will is the cause of its act, not as actually characterized by its act, but as naturally prior to its act. (This is evident from the fact that the will is a free cause of its act: this freedom belongs to the will precisely as it is prior to its own act. For as actually characterized by its act, it has the act as a natural form. It is also clear that something as characterized by its effect as a form is posterior, in the way that a composite is posterior to its form according to *Metaphysics* VII [1029a5–7].) Therefore, the will is not in a different condition in eliciting its act unless it is in a different condition insofar as it is prior to its act. And the will is not in a different condition as it is prior to its act in virtue of having an act inhering in it; for although it is in a different condition insofar as it is characterized by an act, this is only with respect to an accident, not with respect to its nature, that is, qua a first actuality of the sort that the will is. Therefore, no matter what act characterizes the will, it will not be in any different condition in eliciting any act whatsoever. Therefore, no act (or habit) that could be posited in the will as separated from the body that could not be posited in it as conjoined to the body would bring it about that the will elicits a good or bad act in a way opposite to that in which it elicited acts previously. Thus, if it previously acted contingently, it will not elicit an act necessarily because of any such act posited in it.

18 Moreover, as I said in distinctions 4 and 6, both the good and the bad angel had

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<sup>7</sup> According to the edition, the stories of what Lazarus saw arose in the 11<sup>th</sup> and 12<sup>th</sup> centuries and were included in a Perugian manuscript. One can read the accounts in Serafino Razzi, *OP, Vita, e laudi di Santa Maria Maddalena, di San Lazzero, e di Santa Marta* (Florence: Stamperia di Bartolomeo Sermartelli, 1587), 108–112; reproduced as *Vita e laudi di Santa Maria Maddalena, di S. Marta, e di S. Lazzaro, vescovo e martire* (Orvieto: Presso Sperando Pompeii, 1869), 232–238.

time; thus, they were not wayfarers for only an instant.<sup>8</sup> Rather, the bad angel had distinct sins according to a certain order<sup>9</sup>: on the basis of an act of loving himself he elicited an act of loving the supreme advantage, and on the basis of that act he elicited an act of excellence (by which he willed to have that advantage not in submission to the rule of a higher will, but in opposition to it), and finally an act of hating God, who resists him in his desire for that.<sup>10</sup> And he did not have all these distinct acts simultaneously,<sup>11</sup> so when he demerited by his second sin, he was still a wayfarer,<sup>12</sup> even though he had already committed his first sin by his first choice. Therefore, no immovable apprehension of any sort, no first sin, no full throwing himself into an object made him impenitent: for each time he committed one of these sins as a wayfarer, it was not the same as the previous sin.

### C. Refutation of the first view in particular

19 Furthermore, there are arguments against the first view [n. 9] in particular.

First, it rests on a false premise, namely that the intellect is a sufficient mover. I make this clear in Book II, distinction 25.<sup>13</sup>

20 Second, this false premise is inconsistent with their own claims, in two ways. First, because the angel's intellect was correct in apprehending (for punishment did not precede fault), it follows that it moved the angel's will to desire rightly. And it could not move the will in any other way, since the intellect moves in the manner of nature, and consequently it can move only in a manner that accords with the sort of cognition it has; therefore, it moves the will to will rightly. So it follows that the angel's will could never

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<sup>8</sup> *Ord.* II dd. 4–5 nn. 45–46.

<sup>9</sup> *Ord.* II dd. 4–5 n. 45, d. 6 n. 77.

<sup>10</sup> *Ord.* II d. 6 nn. 37–40, 51–54, 63, 78.

<sup>11</sup> *Ord.* II dd. 4–5 n. 45.

<sup>12</sup> *Ord.* II d. 6 n. 78.

<sup>13</sup> See *Lect.* II d. 25 n. 69.

sin.

The second way that this false assumption contradicts their claims is that if indeed there is such a proportion because of the nature of the mover and the movable, the will turns out to be immovable not only after the will's first choice but in or before that first choice. For the angels' intellect presents something immovably before the will's first choice just as it does after it. And if an intellect that apprehends immovably moves the appetite immovably, it follows that in its first act [the angel's will] is moved immovably, and consequently it is not immovable only after its first act.

21 Furthermore, according to them<sup>14</sup> the angel was created in a state of grace. Thus he had some act in a state of grace—for it is not likely that grace was idle in the first instant, since it was not impeded; and if it had been idle, he would likely have sinned by omission—and he did not sin at the same time he was in a state of grace (as is obvious). It evidently follows, then, that at some point he had a good and full choice in accordance with grace, because such a choice would follow his intellect's perfect apprehension; for according to them that is the only sort of apprehension they have, apprehension that is immovable and non-discursive. Therefore, each angel in that first choice confirmed himself in goodness and became impeccable.

22 Furthermore, the difference between human and angelic wills does not support the conclusion, since even granting that angels understand non-discursively what (according to them) human beings understand discursively, the human intellect does not cling movably to the conclusion that it reaches discursively. For a human being holds a conclusion he reaches discursively with just as much certainty—that is, without doubting—as an angel holds a conclusion that he sees in a principle, non-discursively. So this immovability—that is, certainty—on the part of the human intellect would make the human will every bit as immovable as the angelic will is said to be.

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<sup>14</sup> Thomas Aquinas, *ST I* q. 62 a. 3 in corp.

Also, the denial of discursive reasoning to angels does not seem probable, as I show above in the prologue to Book I, in the question “Is theology a science?”<sup>15</sup> and elsewhere.<sup>16</sup>

#### D. Refutation of the second view in particular

##### 23 Arguments against the second view in particular:

Just as a natural agent is not in control of its act, so also it is not in control of its mode of acting. And conversely, just as a free agent is in control of its act, so also it is in control of its mode of acting; consequently, it is in a free agent’s power to act either intensely or non-intensely. Therefore, it need not be the case that a will throws itself into its object with supreme energy just because it is a perfectly free will; on the contrary, a perfectly free will is more in control of how energetically it tends toward its object. And thus it is drawn freely to any object and could, in virtue of its own absolute freedom, not be drawn to that object. And this is confirmed: it does not seem to be the case that all the bad angels sinned with supreme energy, just as not all the good angels merited with supreme energy—or at any rate it was possible for them not to elicit their act with all the force of which their nature was capable.

24 Moreover, it is by one and the same principle that something both tends or is moved toward a terminus and rests in that terminus. Therefore, if by its perfect freedom a perfectly free will tends toward its object, by that same freedom it rests in the object. So from the sort of freedom by which the bad angels sinned—full freedom with respect to tending toward an object—their resting in the object does not follow necessarily; rather, their resting in that object, like their tending toward it in the first place, is merely voluntary and contingent.

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<sup>15</sup> *Ord.* prol nn. 208–209.

<sup>16</sup> *Ord.* II d. 1 nn. 312–314.

25 Moreover, as I discussed in my first argument against both views [n. 14], it cannot be said that the will of a separated soul renders itself fixed on evil through any act that it elicits while in that state, since its becoming fixed on evil was naturally prior to any act it elicited as separated, since it is in its terminus. Therefore, it rendered itself fixed on evil through some act that it elicited while embodied: that was when it got stuck in synderesis. But that's false, both because the person was a wayfarer at that time and because someone can commit a sin on account of which he is damned (if he does not repent afterward) with less energy than someone else (or even he himself) commits that same sin, which is wiped out by repentance.

26 Moreover, against his example of the sharp sword getting stuck in bone: this example, and the whole line of argument, is evidently very like what Hesiod said, according to *Metaphysics* III [1000a9–19]: “those who tasted nectar and manna became immortal.” In that passage the Philosopher ridicules those who, like the followers of Hesiod, “disdained our understanding.” For, as the Philosopher says there, it is impossible to understand what is said in such overstrained or metaphorical language, and neither philosophers nor scientists properly speak in that way. Still, applying the example as well as we can to the question at hand, it can be used to support the opposite conclusion. You see, the reason that a sharp object thrust into a hard body cannot be withdrawn by the cause or force that thrust it in is that the parts of the body into which the sharp object was thrust draw together more, and so the object is compressed more tightly than it was when it was first thrust in. But if the motive force is increased, the object can indeed be withdrawn (assuming that it retains the integrity of its nature) thanks to the increase in motive force. Therefore, when the will is thrust into some object, it retains its integrity in terms of its natural capacities (though it does lose some integrity in the sense that it acquires a deformity: a privation that inheres in it), and the object into which it throws itself has no greater power for capturing the will once it throws itself into the object, because there is no such drawing-together on the

part of the object; so it follows that the will, as active, can withdraw itself.

## II. Scotus's response

27 In order to answer this question we need to look at two things: first, the degrees of goodness and badness; and second, what goodness there could be in the volition of a damned angel, or whether some badness is necessarily in it.

A. The levels of goodness and badness (this part is included in the OUP volume and so is omitted here)

### B. Goodness and badness in the bad angel

40 Concerning the second topic I say that we must understand the angel's ability to have a good volition in terms of this threefold goodness.

#### 1. Generic goodness

41 As for the first sort of goodness, there is no doubt that the angel can and does have many acts whose objects are suitable for those acts: for example, loving himself, hating his punishment, and so on for many other acts.

#### 2. Meritorious goodness

42 But the question about the other two sorts of goodness, virtuous and meritorious, is difficult.

First we should look at meritorious goodness. I say that a bad angel cannot have a meritoriously good volition, understanding that statement in the composed sense, since his being bad and his having a meritoriously good volition cannot both hold at the same time, just as something white can't be black in the composed sense, since that

would mean that one and the same thing would be both white and black at the same time. But if we take the statement in the divided sense, what is denied of the angel can be either logical power or real power, and if real power, then either that which indicates the character of a principle or that which is a difference of being, which indicates an ordering to actuality.<sup>17</sup>

a. The real power that is a principle

43 Concerning real power, we need to see how the angel does not have the power-that-is-a-principle for willing meritoriously. This principle is understood to be either passive or active. If we understand it as passive, the angel has it because his will is something capable of receiving an upright volition: for something that in and of itself is capable of receiving an upright volition does not become incapable of receiving such a volition, so long as it retains its nature. But the angel's will was at one time capable of receiving a good volition, since before his damnation he was able to merit and to be happy; and even now the angel has not lost anything of his natural endowment. Therefore, the angel even now is capable of receiving a good volition.

44 If we understand this principle as an active principle of an upright volition, we can speak either of a total principle of volition or of a partial principle. The will is in fact a partial active principle, as I discussed in Book I, distinction 17 [nn. 32, 151–153] and will discuss below in distinction 25,<sup>18</sup> and according to Dionysius [n. 4] the bad angel has his will intact, the very same will that he had in the state of innocence. Consequently it is not correct to deny that the angel has the power in the sense of the partial active principle of meritorious volition. But this is not a total principle, since the will by itself is not sufficient for willing meritoriously; rather, grace is required as a

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<sup>17</sup> For further discussion of these powers (or kinds of possibility: *potentiae*), see *Ordinatio* I d. 20 nn. 11–12.

<sup>18</sup> See *Lectura* II d. 25 n. 69.

cooperating principle. Further, this will is not a principal partial principle, or a principle that is sufficient for positing the other partial principle in being: for although a will that already has grace and makes use of it is the principal agent with respect to an act, a will that does not already have grace is not sufficient for bringing grace into being, since grace can be brought into being only by God's creating it.

45 And thus the bad angel does not have the total active principle for acting, and he does not have a partial active principle that has the power to produce the remaining partial active principle and remove any impediment to using itself and its co-principle for eliciting their joint act and effect. An example of this would be if a sighted person were in darkness. He would have a partial principle of an act of seeing (indeed the principal principle when light and the power of vision concur), but he would not have the total principle or a principal principle sufficient for bringing into being what is required for the effect of those two partial principles; nor would he be able to remove impediments. And so although he has the power of sight, to the extent that he has a diminished principle with respect to seeing, it is nonetheless not in his power to see. In the same way I say that it is not in the angel's power to will meritoriously, since it is not in his power to have grace or, consequently, to make use of grace, or even to make use of his own will in cooperation with this grace to elicit his own act. But all these negations are true because it is not in the angel's power to have the form he makes use of or to remove impediments.

But there is one matter for debate here. For even if what has been said about the active principle is true concerning the principal effect (which is acting meritoriously by grace, by which one wills meritoriously), there remains an open question about the dispositive principle (or the active principle for disposing) with respect to the principal agent: can the one who has a will as principal active principle dispose himself toward grace?

46 If so, it is evidently in his power, just as it is in a sinful wayfarer's power, to will

well: for a sinful wayfarer cannot do more than dispose himself, and then God gives him the grace by which he afterward acts well.

But I shall discuss in Book IV [d. 14 q. 2 n. [14]] whether a wayfarer can have a movement of contrition through his natural endowment alone, given God's general influence, or whether instead some special act [on God's part] is required. But supposing for now that he can, someone would deny this dispositive power to a damned angel and say that it can belong to a sinful wayfarer.

47 But the authoritative passage from Augustine's *De fide ad Petrum*, cited above [n. 12], evidently contradicts this. That passage acknowledges a greater power in a fallen angel than in a fallen human being to return to the good through his natural endowment alone; so if a human wayfarer can have this dispositive power through his natural endowment alone, much more so can an angel.

48<sup>19</sup> Accordingly, as regards all the divisions of power-as-principle [nn. 43–45], it should evidently not be denied that the angels can will meritoriously except in that they do not have a total principle of merit or a principal partial principle with respect to a good volition or with respect to the special grace that is required for good volition; and, as I shall explain later [nn. 54–56], the angel cannot will well in the same way in which a sinful [human] wayfarer can.

b. The real power that is a difference of being

49 If, by contrast, one understands the question as asking about the power that is a difference of being, which is ordered to actuality, then the question can be answered in the affirmative with regard to remote potentiality, which follows from the character of a passive and an active power, although in a secondary and diminished way. It cannot be answered in the affirmative with regard to proximate potentiality, because proximate

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<sup>19</sup> Note: the paragraph numbering in the edition from 45 through 48 is wonky.

potentiality does not issue in act unless all the impediments are removed, such that what has such potentiality can issue in act straightaway; but such potentiality does not characterize the angel either in virtue of the passive power that the angel has or in virtue of the partial cause that is the angel's will, since one partial cause that is required for acting is lacking.

c. Logical possibility

50 If you understand the question in terms of logical possibility, which indicates a mode of a composition formed by the intellect, such impossibility can exist in a composition either because the terms are intrinsically incompatible with each other or because something extrinsic that is required for the terms to be united [is incompatible with one or both of the terms]. An example of the first: "A human being is irrational." An example of the second: if an eye were in darkness and it were impossible for the opaque body causing that darkness to be removed, it would be impossible to see, not because there is any intrinsic incompatibility between the terms (which are 'eye' and 'seeing') but because something extrinsic—namely, that opaque body—is incompatible with one of the terms—namely, 'seeing.'

51 Applying this to the question at hand, then, I say that in this proposition there is no impossibility in virtue of an intrinsic incompatibility between the terms; on the contrary, there is nothing in the subject that is intrinsically incompatible with the predicate. So if there is any impossibility, it will be in virtue of the incompatibility of something extrinsic with the union of those terms. Now that extrinsic thing can only be an active cause that is required in order for the terms to be united. Only God is apt to be the active cause of the union of grace with a given subject. So the only reason that it will be impossible for bad angels to will well or to have grace is that it is impossible for God to give them grace.

52 Now there are two kinds of impossibility on God's part: in terms of his absolute

power and in terms of his ordained power.<sup>20</sup> God's absolute power is with respect to anything that does not involve a contradiction. And it is evident that in this sense it is not impossible for God to give grace to that nature. For since that nature is capable of grace (as I discussed above in the material on passive power), it follows that there is no contradiction in God's actually informing that nature with grace.

53 God's ordained power, as I discussed in Book I,<sup>21</sup> is power that conforms in acting to rules predetermined by divine wisdom (or rather, by the divine will). And there are rules of justice ordained by God that govern his making rational creatures happy or punishing them. We gather these rules from Scripture. One of them is in Ecclesiastes 11:3: "Wherever the tree falls, that is where it will be." That is, whatever a rational creature persisted in loving, he will remain in that love.

54 And from such rules in Scripture—for example, Isaiah [66:24], "Their fire will not be quenched and their worm will not die," and Matthew 25:46, "These will go to eternal torment, but the righteous into everlasting life"—Augustine concludes in *De civitate Dei* XXI.<sup>23</sup> that it is certain that God will never give them grace. In this sense, then, it would be impossible for them to will well, because it is impossible for God in terms of his ordained power to give them grace.

55 But an argument against this is that if this is so, it seems to be impossible in exactly the same way for a sinful wayfarer who remains unrepentant to the end. For God did not foreordain the giving of grace to that wayfarer, and if there is such great impossibility on that basis, on account of God's ordering, it does not seem any more impossible for a demon to repent than for such a wayfarer to repent.

I reply: God's ordained power does not concern particular divine acts—there are no universal laws concerning particular divine acts—but rather universal laws or rules

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<sup>20</sup> See *Ord.* I d. 44 nn. 3–11.

<sup>21</sup> See *Ord.* I d. 44 nn. 3, 6–7; d. 3 n. 187.

governing possible acts. The law concerning the damned is such a law, whereas the law concerning evil persons who are still wayfaring, even if they remain impenitent to the end, is not such a law. An example of this: if someone established a law that every murderer must be killed, he could not save a particular murderer by his ordained power, consistent with the order that he has already established. But if he could kill some other person, not on account of any such universal law, he could save (in other words, not kill) that person consistent with his ordained power. Thus a wayfarer who will not be saved can be saved, because there is no universal law already established that is contrary to that, as there is such a law contrary to the salvation of someone who is damned.

56 Suppose someone objects: "Just as a law concerns a universal, so also a judgment in conformity with a law concerns a universal, and this judgment follows from the law. (So whatever reason there is for saying that someone cannot act contrary to a law, there is equal reason for saying that he cannot act contrary to the judgment that derives from the law.) Now if this wayfarer is damned, that will be in accordance with a judgment that is consonant with the law. Therefore, etc."

I reply: the law is about someone who is bad at the end of his wayfaring, and so when that law is applied to some particular case (that is, to this or that person, who has already been judged, because he has reached the end of his wayfaring), the judgment is not revoked any more than the law is. Rather, there *is* no judgment according to any law concerning this bad person who is still a wayfarer, just as that general law does not apply to a wayfarer.

57 Another point of controversy is whether the fixity of an evil will is from God or from the will itself. For if it is from the will, it seems that the will is able to withdraw itself from its fixity on evil, just as it was able in and of itself to will evil in the first place. For one rests in something by the same power by which one moves oneself toward it, and by an equal power one can withdraw oneself from it and move oneself

toward something that inclines more, and the object of that power is such a thing. By contrast, if this fixity is attributed to God, it follows that this badness is from God, and thus God is the cause of sin, which seems untenable.

58 About this:

Granted, Augustine in the passage cited earlier from *De fide ad Petrum* appears to say that God ordained that the turning of the will toward evil should endure for ever, and fixity is a mark of an evil will. Nonetheless, as long as the act remains, it in effect has a cause continuously (since its being is in effect its being-continuously-caused); and God cannot be the cause of evil *qua* evil in its continued being, which is its being-continuously-elicited, just as he could not be the cause of evil *qua* evil in its first being-elicited. Therefore, the will alone is the cause of its fixity in evil; but the punishment of fire, which is evil-as-punishment, is from God. One can also say that this fixity, insofar as it indicates the badness of sin in the will, is from God, not in the sense that he positively wills it, but in the sense that he abandons the will and wills-against giving it grace. For just as God bestows grace on someone to whom he purposes to give grace, so too he does not bestow grace on someone whom he abandons; this is what it is for God to will-against bestowing grace.

59 So as to the argument that this fixity is from the will alone, and therefore the will alone can withdraw itself from the object to which it inordinately inclined itself [n. 57], I reply that in order for the will to withdraw itself meritoriously, a principle other than the will—namely, grace—is required; and a bad angel cannot have grace from himself, and insofar as God has abandoned the angel, he has purposed not to give the angel grace. Now you might argue that the angel can at least have a rightly circumstanced willing with regard to the object that he inordinately willed, although that willing would not be meritorious for him. That pertains to moral goodness, which we will discuss in what follows [n. 75].

60 So it is clear from what has been said that we deny the power that is an active

principle only if we take ‘active principle’ as meaning the total or principal principle [cf. n. 44]. We deny the power that is an ordering to act only in the sense of a *proximate* ordering to act [cf. n. 49]. And we deny the logical power only on the basis of an extrinsic cause [cf. n. 51]: and it is not impossible in terms of his absolute power for this extrinsic cause to unite the extremes [cf. n. 52], but only in terms of his ordained power—we gather from Scripture (as Augustine said above) that God has not purposed to unite those extremes [cf. n. 54] and that there is no cause of their remaining in evil apart from their abandonment by God [cf. n. 58], which is to say, because he has purposed not to give them grace, because they are at the end of their wayfaring [cf. n. 59], unlike what he has purposed to do concerning the wicked who are still wayfaring.

61 Evidently this is also proved through the authorities of the saints: first through Damascene, chapter 18 [of *De fide orthodoxa*]: “What for the angels is a fall, for human beings is death”; second through Augustine, *De civitate Dei* XXI.11 and 23: “Nothing in Scripture is more certain than the judgment of Scripture.”

### 3. Virtuous or circumstantial goodness

62 We still need to look at moral goodness and the badness opposed to it.

63 One argument<sup>22</sup> is that the evil angels cannot have a morally good volition because their every volition is malformed in virtue of an inordinate circumstance: they refer every object inordinately to self-love.

64 A similar argument<sup>23</sup>: the habit in them is completely bad, and they have come to the end of their wayfaring, and so that habit inclines them in the most complete way possible.

65 So for the first reason their willing is never good, and for the second reason—that

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<sup>22</sup> Bonaventure, *Sent.* II d. 7 pars 1 a. 1 q. 2 in corp. and ad 4; Thomas Aquinas, *Sent.* II d. 7 q. 1 a. 2 in corp. and ad 2.

<sup>23</sup> Thomas Aquinas, *Sent.* II d. 7 q. 1 a. 2 in corp., *De veritate* q. 24 a. 10 in corp.

is, because of their vehement inclination to evil—their willing is always bad.

66 In support of the first argument one can quote Augustine, *Super Psalmos*, “Lead me, Lord, in the path of your commandments.”<sup>24</sup>

67 Against the first [n. 63]:

Whatever is natural to them remains intact, according to Dionysius in *De divinis nominibus* [n. 4]. Therefore, their natural inclination to the good remains in them; therefore, in virtue of that inclination they can will something that conforms to it. For a power, considered purely according to its nature, can elicit an act consonant with its natural inclination. Therefore, they can have an act that is not bad because it is not contrary to their nature.

68 Furthermore, they have “the worm” [cf. n. 54], which is remorse for their sin. Now that remorse is a certain displeasure that is not a morally bad act: for although it can be deformed by an inordinate circumstance, there does not appear to be any formal moral badness in it if it is no more than the angel’s willing-against his having sinned.

69 Furthermore, if they will-against punishment insofar as it harms their nature, this act by itself (apart from any circumstance) does not appear to be a morally bad act: for just as someone can love his own nature in a way that is not morally bad, so too he can hate what is contrary to his nature.

70 I give three arguments against the second [n. 64]:

First, it seems that in virtue of its freedom the will would be able not to will, and to have no act. Proof: according to Augustine, *Retractationes* I.22.4, “nothing is so much

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<sup>24</sup> Augustine, *Enarrat. in Psalmos* ps. 118 sermon 11 n. 5: “But because everyone is less able to obey the commandments of love by his own strength, unless he is helped by the One who commands and brings about what he commands, the Psalmist says, ‘Lead me in the way of your commandments, because I have willed that path’: my will is unavailing to me, except in that I have willed that you lead me.” Scotus quotes Augustine in this connection in *Rep.* IIA d. 7 qq. 1–3.

in the power of the will as the will itself.” This is not understood as meaning the will as to its first being (for as to its first being, non-will is more in its power than will is), but as to its acting. Therefore, the will is more in the power of the will than any lower power is. But the will can keep any lower power from acting at all; therefore, it can also keep itself from acting at all, and so it does not necessarily will evil.

71 Furthermore, second: I refute the point about habit [n. 64] in two ways.

First, every habit inclines to some act in the same species. Therefore, this habit that is supposedly the cause of sinning inclines either only to an act of pride or only to an act of hatred. Whichever act it is said to incline to, it seems probable that it can at some time not have that act, since it can have another act distinctly and with full effort, and it cannot have two complete acts simultaneously. Therefore, there is no one act that is necessarily continuous in virtue of its vehement inclination toward that act, and consequently it is not the case that in general there is necessarily an evil act in virtue of the habit.

72 Furthermore, a habit does not ground a power’s acting in a way opposite to that power’s characteristic way of acting. This is proved by the same sort of proof that was used earlier [n. 17] against the two views, in the argument about the priority of a cause *qua* cause: a secondary cause does not determine a primary cause’s way of acting, but vice versa. Therefore, if a non-habituated will is capable of not willing this necessarily—as indeed it is, because it is free—a habituated will will not will this necessarily. And so we would need to expound the Philosopher’s remark in *Ethics* VIII [1150a21–22] that “a wicked person is unrepentant” as meaning that such a person repents only with difficulty. For no act in the will can be so intense that it completely takes away the power for the opposite.

73 So regarding this topic [cf. n. 62] it can evidently be said that an evil angel does not necessarily have any bad act, whether we’re speaking of a determinate act or of an indeterminate (or vague) act.

74 This appears to be quite evident in the case of a determinate act, since if the angel has only a determinate habit, that habit inclines him to a definite act, one in species. And it is evident that he can have some other act in a different species, and when he has that other act, he will not have the first one; and by parity of reasoning, he will not then have any other act to which there is no such habit inclining him. And if he should have multiple habits inclining him to acts of different species, it would still be the case that one habit would incline him most vehemently<sup>25</sup>; and he can fail to have an act of the habit that maximally inclines<sup>26</sup> him, so he can fail to have an act of any other habit.

75 The same conclusion is proved in the case of an indeterminate or vague act: either because he can keep himself from any volition, as one argument has it [n. 70]—this is a controversial assumption, since it does not appear that he can keep himself from any act or volition—or because he can at some time have a volition that is not bad in terms of the badness contrary to moral goodness, even though he does not have a good act that has complete moral goodness (which obtains in virtue of all the circumstances). Indeed, there is no evident impossibility even in his having a completely morally good act [cf. n. 67], but at any rate it seems probable that he can have a generically good act: that is, just the act by itself, not deforming it through any circumstances contrary to those required for a good volition. Alternatively, if he has an act characterized by some good circumstances but deformed by some bad circumstances, it need not be the case that he is always bad: for it seems quite remarkable to deny a natural power in that excellent nature when there is no apparent reason to deny it. Yet it is probable that they do not in fact act according to this power only account of their vehement badness; it is more probable that they act on the basis of this badness than on the basis of the natural power by which they would be able to

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<sup>25</sup> Reading *vehentissime inclinatur* (ZBYOQ) for the edition's *non vehentissime inclinatur*.

<sup>26</sup> Reading *maxime inclinantis* (BYOQ) for the edition's *non maxime inclinantis*.

perform acts that are in some way opposed to that badness.

### III. Replies to the initial arguments

76 One reply<sup>27</sup> to the first initial argument [n. 2] is that although they believe, their act of believing is bad because they hate what they believe. But against this: an act of intellect, as it precedes an act of will, is not deformed by the act of will that follows. Rather, in that prior act of intellect they can conceive something true, both a speculative truth such as “God is three” and a practical truth such as “God is to be loved.”

77 So one can admit that the argument does prove something true, namely that they have an act that is morally good in a limited way, in that it is not contrarily bad: it does not have any circumstance contrary to an appropriate circumstance, though it does lack an appropriate circumstance, because the angel does not believe this for the sake of the end for which it ought to be believed, and the circumstance of the end is necessary for moral goodness.

78 To the second argument [n. 3] I say that this “capacity to participate in God,” if we are speaking of the power that is ordered to actuality [n. 49], indicates a remote potentiality. If we are speaking of the power that is a principle [nn. 42–45], it indicates a partial and limited active or passive principle.

79 As for the third argument [n. 4], I concede that there is free choice in them.

80 As for your argument that a power for sinning is not a part of free choice, according to Anselm, I say that it is one thing to speak of a power for sinning (*posse peccare*) and another to speak of the ability to sin (*potentia ad peccatum*). The first indicates an ordering to a deformed act; the second indicates the nature of a principle by which a deformed act can be elicited.

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<sup>27</sup> Bonaventure, *Sent.* II d. 7 pars 1 a. 1 q. 2 ad 1 in opp.

81 Now the first ordering is not absolutely free choice or any part of it. Indeed, no ordering to an act is an active principle or a part of an active principle.

82 Alternatively, I say that that by which someone is able to sin includes two things: one is power, the other is deficiency. That by which someone is able to sin is a power for sinning, and this power (*posse* = being able) is *per se* freedom of choice and a power (*potentia*). The other element, however, does not belong to free choice as such but as defective. Thus, just as free choice in general is that by which someone can will (understanding “in general” as Anselm does, as including God and the blessed), *this* free choice—the created free choice of a wayfarer, which is capable of sinning—is that by which someone can will deficiently. One can, however, identify a dissimilarity: the whole positive being of free choice, and that alone, is the principle of willing absolutely, whereas nothing positive in free choice is directly (*primo*) a principle of the deformity in an act.

83 And then as to the form of the argument, I say that granted that there is freedom in the bad angels, all that follows is that there is a power that can issue in a positive act, which act is from the power *qua* positive power. Consequently, to the extent that an act is from free choice as such, there is no sin; but there can be sin in virtue of a deficiency concomitant with the act.

84 Still, one could concede the whole argument, namely that they have a power not to sin, in that they have a power that is not formally sin, though they do not have a power not to sin in the sense of the power not to be in sin. The evil angels do not of themselves have the power not to sin, that is, not to be in sin, in the same sense in which a sinner is said to be “in sin” after the act that he committed has ceased to exist; and if deprived of grace he remains guilty (until he repents of the sin he committed). And it need not be the case that free choice is a power not to sin in the sense of a power not to be in sin.

85 Now you might argue, on the basis of Anselm’s claim that “free choice is the

power to preserve rectitude for its own sake,"<sup>28</sup> that someone who possesses free choice thereby has the power to preserve rectitude, and thus not to be in sin. I reply that through free choice someone can preserve rectitude when he has it, but not otherwise; and that is how Anselm explains his claim.<sup>29</sup>

86 To the [sixth] argument [n. 7] I say that in merely natural agents, once all impediments cease, a thing returns to its natural disposition unless some violent action prevents it. The reason for this is that an intrinsic principle is a necessary principle with respect to natural goodness (so far as natural goodness depends on that principle). Hence, it always causes such goodness unless it is overcome by something that takes control of it. But this is not the way in which the will is a cause of goodness in its own act. Rather, the will's natural inclination to goodness in its act is, in effect, passive: yes, the will can confer goodness on its act, but it is not inclined by natural necessity to confer goodness in the way that a heavy object is inclined by natural necessity to go downward.

87 Alternatively, it can be said that sin is against nature in the sense that it is contrary to the act that is apt (*natus*) to be elicited in harmony and in conformity with natural inclination. But this need not mean that it is contrary to the will in itself, just as it need not be the case that what is contrary to an effect or to an accident is contrary to the cause or to the subject, especially when such a cause is not a natural cause of the effect, but a free cause.

88 To the [fourth] argument [n. 5], which relies on the comparison between intellect and will, I say that this is indeed decisive against those who say that the intellect is a sufficient mover of the will, since they would have to say that the intellect of the first angel does not conceive any practical principle correctly: for if it did conceive such a

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<sup>28</sup> *De libertate arb.* 3.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, 11–12.

principle correctly, it would move the will in conformity with that principle, and thus correctly. But I think that's false, since first principles in the domain of action are true in virtue of their terms, just as principles in the domain of speculative cognition are. Consequently, an intellect that can conceive the quiddity of the terms of a first practical principle, and can compose them, has what is sufficient to move it to assent to that principle—a mover, in fact, that moves in the manner of nature. So that movement to assent cannot be impeded by the will, whose act is posterior—or at any rate the will can't be drawn to the contrary.

89 I shall leave for elsewhere a discussion of the sense in which the claim in *Ethics* III that “everyone who is bad is ignorant” is true.<sup>30</sup>

90 Nonetheless, in response to this argument it can be said that the comparison has no force, since the intellect can be compelled to assent; thus, it cannot be blind in such a way that it apprehends certain terms in virtue of their evidentness and yet cannot conceive the truth of the complex composed from those terms. The will, by contrast, is not compelled by the goodness of its object. Therefore, it can be turned away [from the ultimate end] in such a way that, however great a good is presented to it, that good does not move it, at least ordinately.

91 To the [fifth] argument [n. 6], I say that if a complete or maximal habit is present (I mean a habit that is as complete as it can be in such a subject or is possessed at the terminus [of one's wayfaring] as foreordained by divine wisdom), all the acts that follow will not increase that habit one bit; they would simply proceed from the habit that has already been generated. Thus a good angel's acts do not increase his habit of charity, either as efficient cause or by way of merit, because he has reached a terminus either according to the nature of the habit, or according to his capacity as subject, or at any rate according to the terminus of his wayfaring as foreordained by God; rather, all

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<sup>30</sup> See *Ordinatio* III d. 36 nn. [11–14].

his acts proceed from the fullness of the habit that is thus complete. And in just the same way, in the case of the bad angels, the completeness of that habit has reached its terminus according to the rule of divine wisdom, which does not allow their badness to increase in intensity; and therefore the acts that follow are simply effects, not agent causes, with respect to the evil habit.

92 On the same basis I can reply to the argument about punishment. For just as the substantial reward given in the first instant in which an angel is happy is determinate and does not increase from then on, because the good acts that follow are not meritorious even though they are good, so too for the damned angel in the first instant of his damnation there is a determinate, fixed punishment that does not grow in intensity. And yet the bad acts that he elicits do not go unpunished, just as the good acts that the good angel elicits do not go unrewarded. Indeed, the good angel's good acts are included in his first act, since they proceed from the perfection of the beatific act; rather, in terms of the accidental reward that those acts can have, each act is its own reward. In the same way, the bad acts that the damned angel elicits are included in the first punishment that is determined for him with certainty; and every act, as it can have its own accidental punishment, is its own punishment. As Augustine says in the *Confessions* [I.12.19], "You have commanded, O Lord, and so it is, that every sinner is his own punishment." For the foremost and greatest punishment is the privation of the greatest good, which in a bad act is the evil of fault, which turns one away from God. Therefore, their punishment increases infinitely in terms of extent, just as their badness does; neither their punishment nor their badness increases in terms of intensity.<sup>31</sup>

93 And if you object that the subsequent evil is a demeritorious act and therefore has a proper punishment corresponding to it, I reply that even if one could concede that there is fault in such an act, it is not properly speaking demeritorious because it is not

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<sup>31</sup> Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Sent.* II d. 7 q. 1 a. 2 ad 5; Richard Middleton, *Sent.* II d. 7 princ. 2 q. 2 ad 2-3.

elicited by a wayfarer, and only wayfarers incur merit and demerit. One could more properly call it a damnatory act, or an act of one who is damned. Similarly, though the act of one who is blessed is acceptable to God, it is not properly speaking meritorious, but instead a beatific act, an act of one who is blessed, or an act that proceeds from blessedness.